The Supreme Court’s decision to hear Barnes v. Felix offers a vital opportunity to reassert the principles laid out in Graham v. Connor, specifically concerning the standard of “objective reasonableness” as it pertains to police use of force. In Graham, the Court affirmed that officers’ actions in such cases should be assessed based on what a reasonable officer would have perceived in that exact, intense moment—without the skewed lens of hindsight. This objective standard is grounded in the realities of law enforcement, acknowledging that officers must make split-second decisions under immense pressure, with no foreknowledge of how a situation might evolve. Graham‘s test does not permit speculative imaginings about alternative actions an officer might have taken; rather, it assesses whether the actual response was reasonable given the immediate threat perceived.

In Barnes v. Felix, however, the theory of “officer-created jeopardy” threatens to undermine Graham by introducing an entirely speculative approach, where officers may be held accountable not merely for their response to a present threat, but for prior actions that allegedly contributed to the need for force. The plaintiffs argue that Officer Felix’s decision to step onto the suspect’s vehicle created the circumstances that led to the fatal confrontation, thereby making him responsible for the escalation. But imposing such a standard risks transforming the clear, moment-of-threat standard into a murky realm of conjecture. By holding officers accountable for prior actions that may have contributed to escalation, we replace a reasonable assessment of imminent threat with speculative hindsight, undermining the very clarity and predictability that Graham was meant to establish.

It is critical here to distinguish between the “officer-created exigency” doctrine, discussed in Kentucky v. King, and this evolving concept of “officer-created jeopardy.” In King, the Court held that officers could create exigent circumstances, such as entering a property without a warrant, if necessary to prevent imminent harm or evidence destruction, provided they did not violate the Fourth Amendment in doing so. This doctrine respects officers’ need to respond to unpredictable, emergent threats, allowing for assertive police action when time is of the essence. It recognizes that exigency often requires officers to make calculated decisions to safeguard public safety without meticulously weighing every possible repercussion.

“Officer-created jeopardy,” by contrast, lacks this foundation of pragmatism and threatens to impose liability on officers for any discretionary tactic that, in hindsight, could be perceived as having increased the risk of a deadly confrontation. This approach fundamentally departs from King by penalizing officers for not foreseeing the exact progression of a fluid encounter, even though it is neither feasible nor fair to expect them to predict every potential outcome in advance. Unlike exigency, which is tied to imminent necessity, jeopardy analysis injects retrospective bias into the evaluation of an officer’s actions. It treats every choice leading up to the use of force as if each were subject to perfect foresight, inviting excessive scrutiny of reasonable, tactical decisions that were made in good faith and in line with training.

This unchecked imposition of hindsight is not merely a theoretical concern; it invites a legal quagmire. If courts allow every pre-force action to be dissected and reconsidered through speculative judgment, the “objective reasonableness” test becomes subjective and unpredictable. Post-incident analysis by prosecutors, especially when influenced by political or societal pressures, is inevitably prone to bias. It risks transforming the lawful, reasoned use of force into a minefield where every action is retroactively judged against an idealized standard that no officer could realistically meet. This chilling effect on law enforcement decision-making will stifle police action, leaving officers uncertain of when they can safely use force and ultimately endangering both public safety and officers’ lives. The Court, therefore, must seize this occasion to reinforce Graham’s reasonableness standard and reject a slippery reimagining of liability that would deter officers from carrying out their duties with confidence and clarity.